The Austrian eID system constitutes a main pillar within the Austrian eGovernment strategy. The eID system ensures unique identification and secure authentication for citizens protecting access to applications where sensitive and personal data is involved. In particular, the Austrian eID system supports three main use cases: Identification and authentication of Austrian citizens, electronic representation, and foreign citizen authentication at Austrian public sector applications. For supporting all these use cases, several components -either locally deployed in the applications' domain or centrally deployed -need to communicate with each other. While local deployments have some advantages in terms of scalability, still a central deployment of all involved components would be advantageous, e.g. due to less maintenance efforts. However, a central deployment can easily lead to load bottlenecks because theoretically the whole Austrian population as well as -for foreign citizens -the whole EU population could use the provided services. To mitigate the issue on scalability, in this paper we propose the migration of main components of the ecosystem into a public cloud. However, a move of trusted services into a public cloud brings up new obstacles, particular with respect to privacy. To bypass the issue on privacy, in this paper we propose an approach on how the complete Austrian eID ecosystem can be moved into a public cloud in a privacy-preserving manner by applying selected cryptographic technologies (in particular using proxy
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Introduction
Unique identification and secure authentication are essential processes especially in security-sensitive areas of application such as e-Government or e-Health.
In particular, these processes play a key role if sensitive data is processed. To ensure a high level of security for citizen applications in these areas, many European countries have already rolled out national eID solutions supporting unique identification and secure authentication. In Austria, the Austrian citizen card is the official eID for citizens [1] .
In general, the Austrian e-Government strategy foresees a thorough eID concept based on the Austrian citizen card, which constitutes the core component for secure identification and authentication of citizens at Austrian e-Government applications. Moreover, the Austrian eID concept also contains representative authentications and authentications of foreign EU citizens, which are treated equally to Austrian citizens in e-Government scenarios. Hence, the main functions of the Austrian eID system are Austrian citizen identification and authentication at online applications, citizen authentication on behalf of a natural or legal person, and the support of foreign citizen authentication at Austrian e-Government applications.
To make these main functions work, the Austrian Austrian eID system involves several other components -besides the Austrian citizen card -which are interconnected to each other. Key components, amongst others, are for instance MOA-ID (Module for Online Applications -Identification) [2] , an open source software component locally deployed in each service providers domain facilitating citizen card access, the MIS (Management Issuing Service) [3] , which constitutes a central service issuing electronic mandates, or the SPR-GW (SourcePIN Register-Gateway) [4] , which a central gateway supporting registration of foreign citizens in Austrian national population registers. Details on the individual components will be given in Section 4.2. Currently, the Austrian eID system treats several deployed MOA-ID instances as well as the MIS and the SPR-GW as trusted entities. While the local deployment model has indeed some benefits, particularly with respect to scalability, in some situations a centralized deployment approach -besides the MIS and the SPR-GW -also of MOA-ID may be preferable. However, in terms of scalability (theoretically the whole Austrian population could use these central services for identification and authentication at service providers) the existing approaches may reach their limits.
This can easily lead to load bottlenecks at MOA-ID, the MIS, or the SPR-GW.
While the use of electronic mandates and foreign citizen authentications are still in its start-up phase, frequent usages are to be expected in the future. The use of electronic mandates in Austria gets increasing popularity. For instance, professional representation or natural-to-legal person representation constitute daily business in legal procedures. Additionally, representation of parents for their children or children for elderly people are frequent use cases especially in health services. Furthermore, cross-border identifications are steadily increasing because the European Commission currently heavily pushes the STORK framework [5] , which will be probably the dominant authentication framework across Europe in the future.
Coping with such increased load may not be easy to handle within the current central deployment scenarios, where each entity is deployed in a trusted data center. Therefore, the authors propose a move of important components of the Austrian eID system (e.g., MOA-ID, MIS, SPR-GW) into a public cloud.
Deployment in a public cloud could definitely mitigate any scalability issues due to the characteristics (high scalability, high elasticity, cost reduction, etc.) provided by a public cloud environment. However, a move of such trusted ser-vice into a public cloud brings up new obstacles, particularly with respect to citizens privacy [6, 7, 8] . Although privacy and security are one of the main issues of public clouds, we still consider the public cloud as the most promising cloud deployment model for a migration of governmental services such as the Austrian eID infrastructure into the cloud. The reasons are -amongst others -particularly the ability to absorb unforeseeable load peaks almost seamlessly and its huge cost savings potential compared to other cloud deployment models [9, 10] . While privacy in the current scenarios is ensured through organizational means, in this paper we illustrate how such a move of trusted services of the Austrian eID system into a public cloud can be successfully realized using cryptographic technologies (by particularly using proxy re-encryption and redactable signatures) by still preserving citizens privacy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly explains related work in the context of identity management. Cryptographic building blocks our work is based on are described in Section 3. In Section 4 the Austrian eID system and its individual components are described in detail. In addition, the three main supported use cases (identification and authentication of Austrian citizens, in representation, and of foreign citizens) and corresponding process flows are explained. How the individual components can be moved into a public cloud in a privacy-preserving manner and how the process flows will change is elaborated in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss our approach with respect to security, privacy, and practicability. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 7.
Related Work
Identity management is no new topic and thus several identity management solutions exist. In this section we briefly outline a couple of identity management systems that have evolved over the past years [11, 12, 13, 14] .
First systems arose due to the need of managing employee's accounts in single organizations. User and identity data was simply stored in directories such as LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol). In this case, the scope 4 of the identity management system was limited to this single organization.
Since the need for cross-organizational communication and hence exchanging identification and authentication data across domains gained importance, more sophisticated identity management solutions have established. One early example of such systems is Kerberos [15] Modinis-IDM study [20] , the IDABC eID country reports [21] , or [22, 23] give an extensive overview of national eID solutions in Europe.
Giving the emerging trend towards cloud computing, identity management gains also importance in this sector. Hence, different cloud identity models have already been defined to cover new requirements particularly relating to cloud computing [24, 25, 26, 27, 28] . The most promising model to fully feature the cloud computing benefits is the operation of an identity provider in the cloud, mostly in the role of an identity broker [29] . Examples for such implementations are Fugen's Cloud ID Broker 9 or the SkIDentity project 10 . However, those solutions totally neglect any privacy issues with respect to the cloud provider.
To bypass this issue, a handful of privacy-preserving cloud identity management approaches have already emerged in the last years. For instance, Nunez et al. [30] proposed the integration of proxy re-encryption into the OpenID protocol. In follow-up work, they proposed a more generic privacy-preserving cloud identity management model, which they call BlindIdM [31] . This model also applies proxy re-encryption but relies on SAML instead of OpenID for the transport protocol. A somewhat related architectural approach -but particularly focusing on eIDs -has been introduced in [32] . A completely different approach based on anonymous credentials for privacy-preservation has been proposed in [33] .
Prior to this paper, in [34] we illustrate privacy-preserving design strategies for migrating the basic Austrian eID architecture into the public cloud. The three design strategies proposed there are based on proxy re-encryption, anony-mous credentials, and fully homomorphic encryption respectively. Thereby, we conclude that using proxy re-encryption is the most practical approach. However, [34] only investigates the basic use case of the Austrian eID system, namely identification and authentication of Austrian citizens (see Section 4 for details).
In this paper we follow a similar approach using proxy re-encryption, but now illustrate the migration of the complete Austrian identity infrastructure into the public cloud. Thereby, we include the two other main uses cases (identification and authentication in representation and foreign citizen authentication), which in part have already been discussed previously in [35, 36] . However, we want to emphasize that it is not a simple combination of these existing results, but we aim at demonstrating that privacy-preserving identity management in public clouds using proxy re-encryption is also possible for complex systems such as the complete Austrian eID ecosystem, which has broad applicability.
Cryptographic Building Blocks
Subsequently, we review cryptographic building blocks that are required within the proposed approach.
Digital Signatures
A digital signature scheme (DSS) is a triple (DSS.KG, DSS.Sign, DSS.Verify) of efficient algorithms, where DSS.KG is a probabilistic key generation algorithm that takes a security parameter κ and outputs a private and public key pair (sk, pk). The (probabilistic) signing algorithm DSS.Sign takes as input a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a private (signing) key sk, and outputs a signature σ. The verification algorithm DSS.Verify takes as input a public (verification) key pk, a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a signature σ, and outputs a single bit b ∈ {true, false} indicating whether σ is a valid signature for m under pk.
One requires a DSS to be correct, i.e., all honestly generated signatures verify, and existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA). In practice one typically employs the hash-then-sign paradigm, i.e., in-stead of inputting m into DSS.Sign and DSS.Verify, one inputs H(m) where H is a suitable cryptographic hash function.
(Public Key) Encryption
A public key encryption (PKE) scheme is a triple (PKE.KG, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) of efficient algorithms, where PKE.KG is a probabilistic key generation algorithm that takes a security parameter κ and outputs a private and public key pair (sk, pk). The probabilistic encryption algorithm PKE.Enc takes as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and returns a ciphertext c = PKE.Enc(pk, m).
The decryption algorithm PKE.Dec takes as input a private key sk and a ciphertext c and returns a message m = PKE.Dec(sk, c) or ⊥ in the case of failure.
A PKE scheme needs to be correct, i.e., decrypting a ciphertext yields the encrypted message, and at least indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks
Abstractly, we can define private key (or symmetric) encryption schemes (SE) analogously. SE.KG generates only a single key k which is used as input to the encryption and decryption algorithms. For the security of a private key encryption scheme (SE) one also requires at least IND-CPA security. Note that when we speak of applying PKE to a message m, then we implicitly mean applying hybrid encryption, i.e., generating a random key k of an SE scheme and sending/storing the tuple (c 1 = PKE.Enc(k, pk), c 2 = SE.Enc(m, k)).
Redactable Signatures
A conventional DSS scheme does not allow for alterations of a signed message without invalidating the signature. So called malleable signatures allow to modify (specified) parts of a signed message without invalidating the signature. Malleable signature schemes which allow removal of parts (replacement by some special symbol ⊥) by any party are called redactable signature (RS) schemes [37, 38] . Basically, they can be constructed from any secure DSS relying on the hash-then-sign paradigm by virtue of modifying the construction of the hash value (typically using randomized Merkle-Hash trees instead of a plain 8 cryptographic hash of the entire message). Besides RS constructions for linear documents, there are also approaches for tree-structured documents, e.g., XML
documents [39, 40] . Below, we present an abstract definition of redactable signature schemes. Henceforth we assume that a secure scheme for linear documents is used and refer the reader to [37] for required security properties.
RS.KG:
This probabilistic key generation algorithm takes a security parameter κ and produces and outputs a private and public key pair (sk, pk). Note that for any redacted signature (m,σ), we have that RS.Verify(pk,m,σ) = true holds.
Proxy Re-Encryption
Proxy re-encryption (RE) [41] is a public key encryption paradigm where a semi-trusted proxy, given a transformation key, can transform a message encrypted under the key of party A into another ciphertext to the same message such that another party B can decrypt with its private key. Although the proxy can perform this re-encryption operation, it does not learn anything about the encrypted message. According to the direction of this re-encryption operation, such schemes can be classified into bidirectional, i.e., the proxy can transform 9 from A to B and vice versa, and unidirectional, i.e., the proxy can convert in one direction only, schemes. Furthermore, one can distinguish between multiuse schemes, i.e., the ciphertext can be transformed from A to B to C etc., and single-use schemes, i.e., the ciphertext can be transformed only once. Moreover, it is desirable that an RE scheme is non-interactive, i.e., a transformation key from A to B can be locally computed by A, where only the public key of B is required. In this approach we exemplary use the unidirectional multi-use identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme of Green and Ateniese [42] , as in our setting we have a master authority (SRA), which can take care of the key generation. For simplicity we omit the inclusion of the MaxLevels parameter (indicating the maximum number of re-encryptions) in our definitions below and note that this parameter needs to be adjusted as required.
RE.Setup:
This probabilistic algorithm gets a security parameter κ. It outputs the master public parameters params, which are distributed to users, and the master private key msk, which is kept private. We assume that params is available to all algorithms and do not explicitly indicate it.
RE.KG:
This probabilistic key generation algorithm gets the master private key msk, and an identity id ∈ {0, 1} * and outputs a private key sk id corresponding to identity id.
RE.Enc:
This probabilistic encryption algorithm gets an identity id ∈ {0, 1} * , and a plaintext m and outputs c id = RE.Enc(id, m).
RE.RKGen:
This probabilistic re-encryption key generation algorithm gets a private key sk id1 (derived via RE.KG), and two identities (id 1 , id 2 ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ) 2 and outputs a re-encryption key
RE.ReEnc: This (probabilistic) re-encryption algorithm gets as input a ciphertext c id1 under identity id 1 and a re-encryption key rk id1→id2 (generated by RE.RKGen) and outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext
RE.Dec: This decryption algorithm gets a private key sk id , and a ciphertext c id and outputs m = RE.Dec(sk id , c id ) or an error ⊥.
We note that as with PKE schemes one requires at least IND-CPA security.
The Austrian eID Concept
Unique identification is essential in sensitive areas of applications such as e- 
as a sequence of attribute labels and attribute values.
To preserve citizen's privacy, it is forbidden by law (based on the Austrian e-Government Act) to directly use the sourcePIN for identification at online applications. According to this act, the sourcePIN must also never be stored outside the Identity Link. Nevertheless, for still being able to uniquely identify Austrian citizens at applications, the Austrian e-Government concept and strategy foresees a sector-specific identification model. Thereby, a sector-specific PIN 
Data storage
The Austrian citizen card can be used for uniquely identifying citizens. Identification is based on the Identity Link, which is solely stored on the citizen card and which includes identifying information such as the sourcePIN. Since the sourcePIN cannot be used directly for identification at online applications because of data protection restrictions, it will be derived according to sectors which results in sector-specific PINs (ssPINs). These ssPINs are finally used for identification at online e-Government applications. Authentication by using the Austrian citizen card is carried out by generating a qualified electronic signature. The Austrian citizen card is capable for generating qualified electronic signatures according to the EU Signature Directive. Signatures created according to this directive are legally equivalent to handwritten signatures. However, this functionality is not only used for citizen authentication but also in other applications such as PDF document signing. The third functionality constitutes encryption and decryption. The citizen card includes an additional key pair which allows for secure hardware-based decryption of arbitrary data.
11 Finally, the third citizen card functionality is data storage, where data of arbitrary format (e.g. XML documents or digital certificates) can be stored on the card.
For accessing citizen card functionality irrespective of its implementation, an abstract access layer has been specified. This abstract layer hides implementation specifics from the application and enables access to citizen card functionality by using XML commands. Implementations of this abstract interface are called Citizen Card Software (CCS). The CCS can be either installed locally on the citizen's computer or is provided remotely on a server.
The Austrian eID Architecture
The overall Austrian eID architecture involves several systems and components. Figure 1 illustrates the Austrian eID architecture separated into operational domains. In the following, we briefly describe the individual components and their basic functionality based on domain separation. Their interactions and individual process flows supporting different use cases will be described in the Section 4.3. Details on the Austrian eID architecture can also be found in [43] .
User Domain: A Citizen wants to access public or private sector service using her Austrian citizen card. The Citizen Card Software, which enables easy access to citizen card functionality, usually runs in the citizen's domain.
Service Provider Domain: A service provider hosts one ore more public or private sector online applications providing web-based services to citizens. 
Identification and Authentication Use Cases
The individual components work all together to support different use cases.
In the following we briefly describe three identification and authentication use cases. A detailed description of the interaction and communication between the individual components will be done in Section 5.2. While privacy in the current scenarios is ensured through organizational means and mainly relies on trust, in the following sections we illustrate how such a move of trusted services into a public cloud can be successfully realized using cryptographic technologies by still preserving citizens' privacy.
The selected cryptographic technologies for the described approach are based on the results of a previous work [34] , which illustrates privacy-preserving design strategies for migrating the basic Austrian eID architecture into the public cloud only. In [34] the only use case that is analyzed is the identification and authentication of Austrian citizens. According to the results in [34] , the use of proxy re-encryption and redactable signatures is considered to yield the most practical approach. Thus, in this paper we continue our work by migrating the complete Austrian eID architecture (covering the additional use cases on electronic representation as well as foreign citizen identification and authentication) using proxy re-encryption and redactable signatures. While parts of the two other main uses cases (identification and authentication in representation and foreign citizen authentication) have previously been discussed in [35, 36] , in this paper we want to show the applicability of the resulting approach of [34] in a complex systems such as the complete Austrian eID ecosystem (with all required components interacting with each other), which has broad applicability. Figure 2 illustrates the new architecture of the Austrian eID system when moving important components into the public cloud. In this figure, for simplicity we subsumed the components MOA-ID, MIS, and SPR-GW to be deployed in one public cloud. However, all three components could be operated by different public cloud providers. The STORK PEPS component is assumed to be operated in a different public cloud, as it will be under responsibility of the foreign country.
The Austrian eID Architecture in the Public Cloud
For being able to move the Austrian eID infrastructure into a public cloud, a few minor changes in the corresponding infrastructure are necessary. In the next sub-section, we explain in detail which changes are required. In the subsequent sections, we describe the adapted process flows of the individual use cases to support an operation of the Austrian eID system in a public cloud.
Identification and Authentication Use Cases

Identification and Authentication of Austrian Citizens
Basically, similar to the current situation we assume the SourcePIN Register Authority (SRA) as trusted entity. In this setup scenario, the SRA will be also responsible for the issuance of a slightly modified Identity Link. Additionally, the SRA will manage service provider registration to build appropriate trust relationships between the individual entities.
Setup. In the proposed cloud scenario, we assume that the modified Identity In addition, service providers need to register their online applications at the SRA. We denote the set of service providers S = {S 1 , . . . , S }. For service provider registration, the SRA produces a private key sk Sj = RE.KG(msk SRA , S J )
for S j and a re-encryption key rk MOA-ID→Sj = RE.RKGen(sk MOA-ID , MOA-ID, S j ).
The key sk Sj is issued to S j and rk MOA-ID→Sj to MOA-ID. We further assume that an appropriate signing key pair (pk MOA-ID , sk MOA-ID ) for MOA-ID is avail-able.
Process Flow. Figure 3 illustrates the process flow combining the current and the cloud-based approach. In fact, the cloud process flow is very similar to the current scenario. However, the differences in the cloud approach compared to the current approach are highlighted in red in Figure 3 . In the following, the current eID process flow as well as necessary modifications for the cloud deployment are described in detail. 8. After successful verification, the online application grants access to the resource.
Identification and Authentication in Representation
Identification and authentication in representation requires a successful identification and authentication of an Austrian citizen as a prerequisite. After that, the Austrian citizen is eligible to select an electronic mandate containing necessary empowerment information for representing a natural or legal person. In the following, we first give details on the setup for supporting a migration of this use case into a cloud environment. In addition, we give details on the process flow highlight similarities and difference between the current process steps and the steps required in a cloud deployment.
Setup. In this scenario, we again assume that the modified Identity Link I is used. Furthermore, in this scenario we additionally rely on the encryption and decryption functionality of the Austrian citizen card. Besides a signature key pair, each Austrian citizen C has an encryption key pair (pk C , sk C ) stored on her citizen card. This key pair is also generated by the SRA.
In addition to (pk Sj , sk Sj ) and rk MOA-ID→Sj , the SRA has to generate additional encryption and re-encryption keys for the individual entities required for mandate processing. For the MIS and for the CR the keys (pk M IS , sk M IS ) and (pk CR , sk CR ) are created. Since the MIS will be operated in the cloud, the SRA keeps secret sk M IS and only distributes pk M IS to the MIS. In addition, the following re-encryption keys are generated: rk MOA-ID→M IS , rk M IS→CR , and rk M IS→MOA-ID . We further assume that appropriate signing keys are available for the individual entities: (pk MOA-ID , sk MOA-ID ), (pk M IS , sk M IS ), and (pk CR , sk CR ).
Process Flow. Figure 4 illustrates the process flow for representative authentication in the current and in the cloud-based approach. In the following, we describe the process flow in detail.
1. This process step is equal to normal and cloud-based Austrian citizen authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1). However, the citizen indicates that she wants to authenticate on behalf of somebody (e.g., by activating a checkbox).
2. This process step is equal to normal and cloud-based Austrian citizen authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1).
3a. In the current scenario, this process step is equal to normal Austrian citizen authentication (cf. Section 5. 8a. In the current approach, the MIS searches the CR for registered mandates using the corresponding ssP IN CR of the citizen. In the cloudbased approach, the MIS sends (c CR , σ M IS ) to the CR. The CR verifies σ M IS , decrypts c CR , and searches its register for mandates using the plain ssP IN CR . In our example, we assume that the mandate information mand and the corresponding mandate ID mandID has been found. The CR signs the mandate and the signature σ CR = DSS.Sign(sk CR , mand mandID)
is calculated.
8b.(new) Since the citizen is known to the CR (the mandate contains further information of the citizen), it can encrypt the mandate for the citizen using pk C resulting in c C = PK.Enc(pk C , mand mandID σ CR ). The CR again signs the encryption result for ensuring integrity and authenticity calcu-
8c. In the current approach, the CR returns all registered mandate information for this citizen. In the cloud-based approach, the data (c C , σ CR ) are returned to the MIS, which verifies the signature 12 .
9a. The MIS presents the citizen a selection page of all available mandates for her. In the cloud-based example, c C is sent to the citizen.
9b.(new)
The citizen decrypts c C and verifies σ CR .
9c. The citizen selects the mandate she wants to use for authentication. In this scenario we assume that she wants to act on behalf of a company and thus selects mandID. In the cloud-based approach, the citizen signs mandID resulting in σ C = DSS.Sign(sk C , mandID). (mandID, σ C ) are returned to the MIS.
10.(n/a) The MIS assembles all necessary mandate information and signs these data to generate an electronic mandate according to the specification defined by [44] . Amongst others, this electronic mandate contains information of the citizen, who represents the company, the company, and the type of empowerment the citizen is allowed to act on behalf. This step is not applicable in the cloud approach as the mandate information is a valuable asset which must not to be disclosed to the cloud provider. is now able to do online procedures on behalf of the selected company.
Identification and Authentication of Foreign Citizens
In this section the identification and authentication of foreign citizen in the current approach and in the cloud approach are described in more detail.
Setup. In the previous scenarios we assumed the SRA to be the trusted entity that issues appropriate key material to the involved entities in the Austrian eID system. In this scenario we have to deal with a cross-border scenario, hence we need a trusted entity being able to serve entities across borders. In the current STORK concept, the European Commission (EC) plays a central role managing trust across the involved STORK entities. Therefore, also for our scenario we assume the EC being the entity that issues secure key material to the individual STORK entities and thus we skip a detailed description on that. In this scenario, the EC generates (pk P EP S , sk P EP S ) and issues pk P EP S to the PEPS only. It keeps secret sk P EP S . Furthermore, the SRA issues (pk M OA−ID , sk M OA−ID ), (pk SP R−GW , sk SP R−GW ), (pk SP , sk SP ), and We further assume that appropriate signing keys are available for the individual entities: (pk MOA-ID , sk MOA-ID ), (pk P EP S , sk P EP S ), (pk F −IdP , sk F −IdP ), (pk SP R−GW , sk SP R−GW ), and (pk SR , sk SR ).
Process Flow. Figure 5 illustrates the process flow identifying and authenticating a foreign citizen in the current and cloud-based approach. In the following, we describe the process flow in detail.
1. A foreign EU citizen wants to access a service of an Austrian online application.
2. The online application assembles an appropriate SAML authentication request and sends it to MOA-ID.
3. MOA-ID presents the foreign citizen a page where the citizen can select her country of origin.
4. The citizen provides her home country she originates from. 5. According to the STORK idea, the foreign citizen will be authenticated in her home country. Therefore, the citizen is redirected to a single gateway (PEPS) in the foreign country, being part of the STORK infrastructure.
For starting this authentication process, MOA-ID transmits a STORK authentication request to the foreign PEPS. The PEPS selects an appro-priate foreign IdP (F-IdP), where the citizen actually authenticates.
6. The PEPS forwards the authentication request to the F-IdP.
7. The F-IdP requests the citizen to authenticate using a qualified signature.
8. The qualified signature is returned to the F-IdP.
9. In the current approach, the F-IdP provides the qualified signature as well as other citizen identifying information (first name, last name, date of birth, identifier) to the PEPS. In the cloud-based approach, we assume the Foreign IdP to be a trusted entity and that it encrypts the foreign citizen's identification data for the PEPS using pk P EP S resulting in c P EP S = RE.Enc(P EP S, f c data ). Furthermore, c P EP S is signed using 
10.(new)
The PEPS re-encrypts c P EP S for MOA-ID using rk P EP S→MOA-ID into c MOA-ID . In addition, c MOA-ID is signed using sk P EP S resulting in σ P EP S .
11. In the current approach, the PEPS assembles the citizen data retrieved 19.-21. These process steps are equal to normal and cloud-based Austrian citizen authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1). In the cloud-based approach, the online application verifies σ MOA-ID and decrypts c SP using sk SP .
Analysis and Discussion of the Proposed Model
In this section we discuss the proposed migration of the Austrian eID system into the public cloud concerning security and privacy as wells practicability aspects.
Security and Privacy Discussion
Our work is based on the assumption that a cloud provider hosting or operating an entity is acting honest but curious [47, 31] , i.e., the cloud provider operates and works correctly but is not trusted with respect to (data) privacy 13 .
In this section we investigate and discuss which personal and sensitive data are disclosed to an entity of the Austrian eID system operated in a public cloud.
We thereby compare the information disclosed or seen, respectively, by an entity operated by a public cloud provider. Table 1 illustrates the comparison of the current Austrian eID system and the ported eID system to the cloud with respect to personal or sensitive data disclosed. Since encrypted data is seen as privacy-preserving data, any encrypted data disclosed at an entity in the cloud will not be mentioned.
The comparison Table 1 follows the structure of the previous chapters and sections, where three different use cases for the Austrian eID system are dis- 13 A discussion of security and privacy issues when acting with a totally untrusted cloud provider is out of scope of this work and left for future work. However, under such an assumption data confidentiality and data integrity can still be ensured due to the use of encryption and signature technologies.
tinguished (Identification and Authentication of citizens, in representation, of foreign citizens). In the following, privacy-sensitive data, which is revealed to the individual components, is discussed in detail. However, we only compare those components which are finally ported into the public cloud as they can be considered untrusted with respect to privacy. All other components are trusted and thus do not need a further analysis.
Identification and Authentication of citizens:
In this use case only MOA-ID is involved, hence only this component needs to be investigated with respect to privacy. In the current scenario the citizen's identity link (including her name, date of birth and sourcePIN) is exposed to MOA-ID. Additionally, MOA-ID knows the governmental sector of the application the user wants to authenticate and thus also the ssPIN, which is derived out of the citizen's sourcePIN by MOA-ID. Finally, also the citizen's signing certificate is disclosed to MOA-ID.
In contrast to this data set, in the cloud-based approach only the governmental sector of the application the citizen wants to log in remains visible to MOA-ID and the cloud provider respectively. All other data is transferred in encrypted form to MOA-ID only.
Identification and Authentication in representation:
In this scenario the components MOA-ID and MIS are involved. Equal of the previous use case, in the current approach MOA-ID gets to know the citizen's identity link (including her name, date of birth and sourcePIN), the citizen's signing certificate, and subsequently the governmental sector of the application and the citizen's ssPIN. The identity link data is also disclosed to the MIS.
Since the MIS handles all relevant functionality with respect to authentication on behalf, the MIS also sees all all registered mandate information of the citizen. The reason is that the MIS queries all available registers to find existing mandate information for the authenticating citizen. This mandate information is bundled at the MIS for displaying it to the user. After selecting a mandate by the user, the MIS also knows which mandate has been selected. Due to that, the MIS also gets the information of the empowering mandator. Since MOA-ID and the MIS are interconnected, for fulfilling a successful authentication process in representation all selected mandate information (mandate type, mandator, empowerment, etc.) is also disclosed to MOA-ID. Hence, a lot personal information is disclosed to both components.
Having a look at the cloud approach again, only a minimum of those data are disclosed to MOA-ID and the MIS in this setup. During an authentication process in representation, the MIS only learns the ID (mandID) of the selected mandate by the citizen. In addition, MOA-ID only gets to know the governmental sector of the application. No further privacy-sensitive data is disclosed to either MOA-ID or the MIS because it is processed in encrypted form only.
Identification and Authentication of foreign citizens:
In this use case the components MOA-ID, SPR-GW, and PEPS are involved.
Already at the start of an authentication request, MOA-ID gets to know the citizen's home country because MOA-ID needs to forward the citizen to the respective PEPS for authentication. After successful authentication of the foreign citizen at the F-IdP, all requested citizen data (name, date of birth, unique identifier, signing certificate) 14 is disclosed to the PEPS for further processing.
All these data is returned from the PEPS to MOA-ID, thus these data is also disclosed MOA-ID. For registering the foreign citizen in the Austrian Supplementary Register of Residents, these data are forwarded by MOA-ID to the SPR-GW. Out of the signing certificate, the SPR-GW also gets to know the citizen's home country. The SPR-GW registers the citizen and as return data it receives the Austrian identity link of the foreign citizen. This identity link also includes the Austrian unique identifier (sourcePIN), which constitutes sensitive information. The identity link is further exposed to MOA-ID, which uses the governmental sector and the sourcePIN for calculation of the ssPIN.
14 The STORK framework and protocol also supports the transfer of many more attributes.
However, for the authentication at an Austrian service provider the name, date of birth, unique identifier, and signing certificate are sufficient, hence we skip a detailed discussion of additional attributes.
Again, compared to all exposed information described above in the current setting, only the governmental sector of the application is disclosed to MOA-ID in the cloud approach. No further sensitive information is disclosed to any of the components MOA-ID, SPR-GW, or PEPS. All data is only available in encrypted form at these components.
Practicability Discussion
In this section the proposed cloud approach based on selected criteria with respect to to practicability is discussed. The following criteria were selected: Governance Structure: For the current situation there is a proper governance structure in place. Meaning, proper trust relationships are (e.g.
based on digital certificates) between the individual components. However, the use of re-encryption functionality adds an additional layer of governance requirements. Encryption and decryption key pairs as well as re-encryption keys need to be properly distributed amongst the involved components. This puts some additional complexity to the SRA for use cases involving Austrian citizens only. In addition, also the European Commission and foreign countries are affected as re-encryption functionality is also required across borders. In particular, key management and distribution based on a public key infrastructure (PKI) to the individual components needs to be carried out properly. However, the effort for these tasks can be considered reasonable as the number of involved components is limited (In Austria besides MOA-ID, SPR-GW, and the MIS a few registers and several service providers, in foreign countries besides the PEPS especially different F-IdPs).
Related Work Discussion
Related Work on using Proxy Re-Encryption: One of the first approaches using proxy re-encryption for identity management in the cloud appeared in [30] , which integrated proxy re-encryption into the OpenID protocol. by integrating proxy re-encryption functionality into SAML. However, [30, 31] rely on proxy re-encryption for privacy preservation only, whereas our approach additionally uses on redactable signatures, as an additional privacy-preserving mechanism ensuring integrity and authenticity at the same time.
Related Work on using Anonymous Credentials: Anonymous Credential systems (aka Privacy ABCs) are a valuable mechanism for ensuring privacy in identity management and have been discussed in context of eID systems, e.g, their integration in the German eID architecture [33] . While early implementations of anonymous credential systems, e.g., idemix [48] on a Java Card [49] , however, were too expensive from the user's (client's)
perspective, state-of-the-art implementations [50, 51, 52 ] already achieve reasonable efficiency. While anonymous credentials are a valuable means for ensuring privacy in identity management, performance is typically still much slower than when using proxy re-encryption.
Conclusions
The Austrian eID system plays a major role in the Austrian e-Government To overcome such scalability bottlenecks in the future, in this paper we presented a solution by moving important centralized services of the Austrian eID system (MOA-ID, MIS, SPR-GW, and PEPS) into a public cloud which considerably improves scalability. By applying appropriate cryptographic technologies we are able to improve scalability by preserving citizen's privacy with respect to the public cloud providers at the same time. We therefore can conclude that for all identification and authentication use cases no sensitive personal information will be disclosed to a public cloud provider in the cloud-based approach since all data processed in the cloud is encrypted. This strongly preserves citizen's privacy even if public cloud providers assuming to be acting honest but curious are involved in the proposed architecture. In addition, no major changes to existing infrastructure or the current process flows are required. Only decryption/encryption/re-encryption functionality need to be additionally supported by the individual components and the data transfer protocols must be capable of encrypted data. However, efforts for implementing encryption functionality might be low and encrypted data can also easily transmitted by standard data exchange protocols such as SAML [31] or OpenID [30] . Finally, a proper governance structure for additional management of encryption/decryption/reencryption keys needs to be setup. Nevertheless, this can be easily integrated into existing organizational procedures. 
